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Article 2

Is the Natural Accumulation Rule All Wet?
Michael J. Polelle"

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Hankla v. Burger Chef Systems, Inc.,' the Illinois Appellate
Court broadly concluded that what has been termed the natural accumulation rule is well established in Illinois. Under the rule, neither
a governmental entity nor a private landowner is liable for injuries

caused by a natural accumulation of ice, snow, or water on public or
private premises-even if the landowner is aware that the accumulation
is hazardous.3 At the time Illinois adopted this rule, it followed the
lead set in other states that governmental entities should not be held
liable for injuries resulting from ice and snow on their streets and side-

walks.4
Nevertheless, several appellate decisions properly note that many
other states have now come out against the natural accumulation rule.5
Furthermore, policies which may have once justified the rule are arguably no longer valid, particularly insofar as the rule applies to

private parties.6 In fact, one appellate decision concluded that a key
Illinois Supreme Court opinion on the matter is antiquated.7 These
* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School; B.A., 1959, Loyola University
of Chicago; J.D., 1963, Harvard School of Law; LL.M., 1965, The John Marshall Law
School; Professor-Reporter to the Illinois Judicial Conference. This Article is based on
a seminar from the 1994-95 regional meeting of the Illinois Judicial Conference on
Civil Law: Selected Tort Topics.
1. 418 N.E.2d 35 (Il1. App. 4th Dist. 1981).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 36.
4. Graham v. City of Chicago, 178 N.E. 911, 912-13 (111.
1931). For further
discussion of Graham, see infra notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Watson v. J.C. Penney Co., 605 N.E.2d 723, 725 (Ill.
App. 4th Dist.
1992) (observing that Alaska, Maine, and Michigan have overruled the natural
accumulation rule), appeal denied, 612 N.E.2d 525 (I11.
1993); Smalling v. LaSalle Nat'l
Bank, 433 N.E.2d 713, 715 (111. App. 4th Dist. 1982) (observing that Alaska,
Colorado, Michigan, and Oregon have abandoned the rule). For further analysis, see
infra part VII and appendix.
6. For further discussion, see infra parts VIII-IX. For example, the Hankla court noted
that Illinois courts have not defined just what makes an accumulation a "natural" one.
Hankla v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 418 N.E.2d 35, 36 (Ill. App. 4th Dist. 1981).
7. Lansing v. County of McLean, 359 N.E.2d 165, 169 (I11.
App. 4th Dist. 1977)
("This writer is of the opinion that [Strappelli v. City of Chicago, 20 N.E.2d 43 (Ill.
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justifications warrant a reexamination of the natural accumulation rule.
This Article examines the natural accumulation rule in detail and
analyzes whether it is still appropriate for Illinois. Part II of this
Article traces the origin of the rule in Illinois as a rule used primarily to
exonerate governmental entities. In Parts III and IV, this Article discusses how the Illinois Appellate Court has expanded this rule to
exonerate private parties. Parts V and VI examine two methods by
which plaintiffs can avoid the rule: (1) by proving that the hazard was
artificial, or (2) by showing that the defendant voluntarily assumed a
duty and performed it negligently. In Part VII, this Article examines
the rule as applied in other states, and in Part VIII, this Article
evaluates the rule's shortcomings. Finally, Parts IX and X conclude
that although the rule has no justification as applied to governmental
entities, it is particularly inappropriate as applied to private parties and
should be abolished.
II. HISTORICAL ORIGIN: LIABILITY ON GOVERNMENT
PROPERTY
In 1931, in Graham v. City of Chicago,8 the Illinois Supreme Court
resolved appellate court uncertainty by holding that a city is only liable
for injuries arising from the failure to remove snow and ice from its
streets and sidewalks when the dangerous conditions which resulted
from the snow and ice were produced by "artificial" causes.9 In
Graham, public school authorities flooded a schoolyard during
freezing weather in order to provide a skating area for students.' °
During this process, however, the school authorities allowed water to
overflow onto a sidewalk on which the plaintiff slipped thirteen days
later."
Noting that other states had exonerated cities for injuries resulting
from "natural accumulations" of snow and ice on their streets and
sidewalks, 2 the Illinois Supreme Court observed that it would be
1939)], a case decided in 1939, properly fits the circumstances of that time, but that it is
ill-suited to today's conditions in which governmental units possess the means to
neutralize dangerous conditions arising from prolonged accumulations of ice on
highways."), aff'd on other grounds, 372 N.E.2d 822"(Ill. 1978). Nevertheless, another
appellate court has disagreed with this, maintaining that the rule is still appropriate.
See Williams v. Lincoln Towers Assocs., 566 N.E.2d 501, 503 (II1. App. 2d Dist.),
appeal denied, 575 N.E.2d 925 (Ill. 1991).
8. 178 N.E. 911 (I11.
1931).
9. Id. at 913.
10. Id. at 912.
11. Id. at 913.
12. Id. at 912.
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"unreasonable to compel a city to expend the money and perform the
labor necessary to keep its walks reasonably free from [natural accumulation of] ice and snow during winter months."' 3 The Graham
court emphasized that immunity under these circumstances must be
limited to cases in which the ice and snow result from natural causes. 4
Because the city in this case not only flooded the sidewalk, but also
allowed the ice to remain on the sidewalk for thirteen days after actual
notice of the dangerous condition, the supreme court found the city

liable for the plaintiff s injuries."
In Riccitelli v. Sternfeld,16 the Illinois Supreme Court expanded the
rule to exonerate private citizens as well.' 7 In Riccitelli, the defendants, gasoline station operators, had cleared away snow from their
driveways and public sidewalks, piling the snow along each side of
the public's path. 8 Alternate freezes and thaws caused ice to form on
the sidewalks, and although the defendants placed rock salt along the
walks, the salt did not keep the plaintiff from slipping and falling.' 9
The supreme court concluded that the defendants were not liable,
although it failed to classify the hazard as natural.20 Riccitelli appears
13. Id. at 913. The supreme court later applied this "natural accumulation rule" to
exonerate the City of Chicago for severe injuries suffered by a passenger who fell on an
icy safety island and slipped under a streetcar. Strappelli v. City of Chicago, 20 N.E.2d
43, 44 (ll. 1939) ("The snow and ice on the safety island in question accumulated as a
result of natural causes and the condition was undoubtedly a general one throughout the
city on the day of the injury.").
14. Graham, 178 N.E.2d at 913. The supreme court stated:
[T]he rule must be predicated on the formation of ice from natural causes, for it
would be neither unreasonable, impracticable, nor expensive, as a general
proposition, to compel the removal of ice from sidewalks which was produced
by artificial causes. It is the generality of a situation resulting from natural
causes that gives rise to the rule. Without that generality there would be no
reason for the rule. There is no more cause for excusing a city from liability
where damages have accrued from ice which has formed on a walk in an
unnatural way than there is to excuse it from damages when a walk has been
permitted to become defective from any other cause.
Id.
15. Id. (explaining that "[tihe city's liability did not arise from the mere flooding of
the sidewalk, but from its neglect to remove the ice which had formed there in an
artificial way and its omission to make the place reasonably safe after notice of the
dangerous condition.").
16. 115 N.E.2d 288 (Ill. 1953).
17. Id. at 290. It is significant that although the Illinois Appellate Court has
extended the rule to immunize private parties in other cases, see infra parts Ill-IV, the
Illinois Supreme Court has only examined the rule for private parties in the context of
public roads and sidewalks.
18. Riccitelli, 115 N.E.2d at 289.
19. Id. at 289-90.
20. Id. at 290. As the supreme court noted:

634

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 26

to have been motivated less by logic than by the policy that citizens
should be encouraged to clear away snow and ice from public ways,
21
especially because these citizens have no legal obligation to do so.
The Illinois General Assembly has also addressed this problem by
passing two statutes affecting the application of this rule. In 1965,
Illinois enacted the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees
Tort Immunity Act 22 (the "Tort Immunity Act") which essentially
codified the natural accumulation rule as it applied to public entities.23
Under the Tort Immunity Act, "[n]either a local public entity nor a
public employee is liable for an injury caused by the effect of weather
conditions . . . on ...public ways. 24 In addition, in 1979, Illinois
enacted the Snow Removal Act 25 to immunize private citizens from
liability arising from their negligent attempts to remove ice and snow
from public sidewalks adjoining their residences.26
In one sense, both the Tort Immunity Act and the Snow Removal
Act provide broader immunity than the common law rule because
Whether or not the snow which melted to form the ice on which the plaintiff
slipped came from snow which had been shoveled off the walk or snow which
had been removed from plaintiffs driveway no one can say. Suffice it to say,
that to form the ice in question the snow had to melt and run from piles which
had been banked during a snow-removal operation. This ice could have been
formed by the snow which the city pushed up over the curb from the street.
Certainly, there is no showing of any act on the part of defendants which
places upon them the liability for this injury.
Id.
21. See id. The supreme court repeated the First Appellate District's statement that
"[t]he general assumption is that the industry displayed by citizens removing snow after
a snowfall is desirable, if not necessary." Id. (quoting Riccitelli v. Sternfeld, 109
N.E.2d 921, 922 (I11.
App. 1st Dist. 1952), aff'd, 115 N.E.2d 288 (Ill.
1953)).
22. 1965 II. Laws 2983, §§ 1-101 to 10-101 (codified as amended at ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. ch. 745, §§ 10/1-101 to 10/10-101 (West 1993)).
23. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 745, § 10/3-105(a) (West 1993). In contrast, the
general principle expressed in the Tort Immunity Act is that a municipality owes a duty
of reasonable care in maintaining its property for individuals using the property in a
reasonably foreseeable manner. Id. § 10/3-102(a).
24. Id. § 10/3-105(a).
Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury
caused by the effect of weather conditions as such on the use of streets,
highways, alleys, sidewalks or other public ways.... For the purpose of this
section, the effect of weather conditions as such includes but is not limited to
the effect of wind, rain, flood, hail, ice or snow but does not include physical
damage to or deterioration of streets ....
Id.
25. P.A. 81-591, §§ 1 to 2, 1979 Ill. Laws 2328 (codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
ch. 745, §§ 75/0.01 to 75/2 (West 1993)).
26. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 745, § 75/1 (West 1993); see also infra notes 11011 and accompanying text.
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neither distinguishes between natural and artificial snow or ice.27 Yet,
at the same time, the Tort Immunity Act expressly permits liability
where the weather conditions caused physical damage or deterioration
of public ways or traffic signals. 28 Furthermore, the Snow Removal
Act preserves liability when private landowners willfully or wantonly
impose snow or ice hazards upon pedestrians.29
Interpreting the provisions of the Tort Immunity Act, the Illinois
Supreme Court, in Lansing v. County of McLean,3° upheld a motion
to dismiss a wrongful death claim resulting from a driver whose
automobile swerved out of control on a sheet of highway ice and
crashed into a culvert. 3' The Lansing complaint alleged that the county
failed to remove or warn of ice and slush which had accumulated on
the highway two days earlier, even though the same highway was free
of snow and ice in a neighboring county.32 In reversing the demurrer,
the Lansing court held that under the terms of the Tort Immunity Act,
the county waived any immunity it might have had by virtue of
purchasing liability insurance to cover this type of incident.33 Despite
this waiver, however, the supreme court denied recovery by concluding that the natural accumulation rule predated the statute and
provided a separate common law defense.34
27. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 745, § 10/3-105 (the Tort Immunity Act); id.
§ 75/2 (the Snow Removal Act); cf. Bellino v. Village of Lake in the Hills, 520 N.E.2d
1196, 1197-98 (I11. App. 2d Dist. 1988) (exonerating the village under the Tort
Immunity Act despite the plaintiff's claims that piling snow into mounds during a
removal process resulted in an unnatural accumulation).
28. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 745, § 10/3-105(a). In practice, it may be difficult to
distinguish between an "effect" of weather conditions, for which no liability exists, and
"physical damage or deterioration" of property resulting from weather conditions, for
which liability does exist. See Ciochon v. Bellino, 540 N.E.2d 840 (I11.App. 1st Dist.
1989) (finding a question of fact whether the malfunction of street lights was an "effect"
of weather conditions or the result of "physical damage").
29. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 745, § 75/2.
30. 372 N.E.2d 822 (Ill. 1978).
31. Id. at 824.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 825. The supreme court had previously held that if a public entity is
insured, then the Tort Immunity Act provides a waiver from any immunity it otherwise
may have. Id. (citing Sullivan v. Midlothian Park Dist., 281 N.E.2d 659 (Ill. 1972)).
34. Id. at 826. The supreme court observed that "[t]he rule announced in Graham and
Strappelli did not indeed rest on a doctrine of governmental immunity, but rather upon
the absence of liability in circumstances where the defendant had taken no action
contributing to the injury." Id. (citing Graham, 178 N.E. 911, and Strappelli, 20 N.E.2d
43).
After holding that the natural accumulation rule applied to the case, the supreme court
held that the county had no duty to warn motorists of the condition of the highway. Id.
at 827. Furthermore, the supreme court observed that the complaint alleged no facts
showing that the county had actual or constructive notice of the conditions on the
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The entrenchment of the natural accumulation rule can best be seen
in cases involving common carriers. Normally, a common carrier,
such as an airline or a bus service, owes its passengers not just a duty
of ordinary care, but a duty of the highest care. 3' Notwithstanding this
general principle, Illinois courts have uniformly ruled that the natural
accumulation rule supersedes the elevated duty of common carriers.36
III. BEYOND LIABILITY ON GOVERNMENT PROPERTY:
LANDLORD-TENANT

Significantly, the Illinois Supreme Court has only used the natural
accumulation rule in decisions involving public roads and sidewalks.37
In 1952, however, the Second District of the Illinois Appellate Court,
aware that it was treading upon new ground,38 held that a private
landlord owed no duty to remove ice and snow accumulating from39
natural causes on a common private sidewalk shared by all tenants.
In Cronin v. Brownlie,4 ° the appellate court extended the natural
accumulation rule to exonerate private landlords, without analyzing in
detail whether the same policies that justified immunizing governmental entities also justified extending the rule to private landlords.4'
highway in sufficient time to provide a warning. Id.
35. E.g., Serritos v. Chicago Transit Auth., 505 N.E.2d 1034, 1038 (Ii. App. 1st
Dist.), appeal denied, 515 N.E.2d 127 (11. 1987).
36. See, e.g., Sheffer v. Springfield Airport Auth., 632 N.E.2d 1069, 1071 (II. App.
4th Dist. 1994) (holding that a municipal airport authority owes no duty to its
passengers to clean away natural ice from either the tarmac or the pathway leading to the
airport terminal); Serritos, 505 N.E.2d at 1039 (holding that a municipal transit system
has neither a duty to clear its vehicles of natural precipitation nor a duty to warn its
passengers of the dangerous conditions). Illinois courts have also extended the no-duty
ruling to the owners of non-municipal building elevators, who also traditionally owed
the duty of highest care to their passengers. Shoemaker v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's
Medical Ctr., 543 N.E.2d 1014, 1017 (11. App. 1st Dist. 1989).
37. But see McElligott v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 227 N.E.2d 764, 770 (Ill. 1967)
(admitting that "[a] railroad has no greater duty than a municipality to remove or
otherwise offset the effect of natural accumulations of snow or ice from that part of its
right of way not encompassed by its crossings and approaches.").
38. Cronin v. Brownlie, 109 N.E.2d 352, 354 (I11.App. 2d Dist. 1952) ("We find no
cases in Illinois exactly in point. The authorities throughout the country appear to be
divided.").
39. Id. at 356. The Snow Removal Act applies only when the injury occurs on a
public sidewalk. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 745, § 75/2; see also supra notes 25-26
and accompanying text.
40. 109 N.E.2d 352 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1952).
41. Instead, the appellate court examined cases in other states exonerating landlords
and concluded that, because ice and snow are common in our climate, landlords should
not be liable unless they create a greater danger than was brought about naturally. See
id. at 355-56. The court stated:
In our northern climate where ice and snow come frequently and are accepted by
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Cronin and its progeny are an exception to the general rule that in
maintaining common areas, a landlord owes a duty of reasonable care
to all people lawfully on the premises.42
The extension of the natural accumulation rule to cover landlords did
not go uncontested. In Durkin v. Lewitz,4 3 the Second Division of the
First Appellate District disagreed with the Second Appellate District's
conclusion in Cronin.44 On similar facts,45 the Durkin court rejected
the rule approved in Cronin.46 Instead, the appellate court in Durkin
promulgated a different rule: landlords must use reasonable care to
keep their premises reasonably safe, including using reasonable care to
remove natural snow and ice hazards. 47 The Durkin court observed
that although the rule adopted in Cronin is considered by some to be
the majority rule, the authorities appeared to be equally divided and
that many cases cited as support for the rule do not truly support it.'
all, it appears to us that the rule adopted by the majority of the states finding
no liability against the landlord is more reasonable and persuasive than the
minority view. Applying the majority rule [in other jurisdictions] to the facts
in the instant case, it appears to us to be unreasonable and somewhat
impractical to require a landlord to remove ice and snow from sidewalks used
jointly by his tenants where the ice and snow arise from natural causes.
Id. at 356.
42. E.g., Murphy v. Illinois State Trust Co., 31 N.E.2d 305, 307 (I11. 1940); accord
Kuhn v. General Parking Corp., 424 N.E.2d 941, 945 (111. App. Ist Dist. 1981). The
Illinois Appellate Court has agreed with the position taken by the Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 361 (1965), subjecting a landlord to liability for physical harm caused by a
dangerous condition on that portion of the land within the landlord's control, if by
reasonable care the landlord could have discovered the condition and made it safe. E.g.,
Magnotti v. Hughes, 373 N.E.2d 801, 803 (I11.App. 5th Dist. 1978).
43. 123 N.E.2d 151 (I11.App. 1st Dist. 1954).
44. See id. at 155-56.
45. In Durkin, the plaintiff was a household employee of the tenants who fell on
loose ice on the landing of an apartment building's second floor. Id. at 153. Neither the
court nor the defendants disputed the plaintiff's claim that the ice resulted from a
defective roof gutter. Id.
46. Id. at 155-56. In a thorough analysis, the Durkin court referred to the rule
approved in Cronin as the "Massachusetts rule" which holds that the failure to remove
snow and ice poses no liability. Id. at 155 (citing Cronin, 109 N.E.2d 352). The Durkin
court opined that although the rule may be appropriate in Massachusetts, which only
requires landlords to maintain the premises as they existed at the time of the letting, it is
inappropriate for Illinois, which requires landlords to use reasonable care in maintaining
the premises. See id. at 155-56.
47. Id. at 156. In contrast to the Massachusetts rule, the Durkin court referred to its
rule as the "Connecticut rule." Id. Under the Connecticut rule, a landlord is not
automatically exempted from liability for injuries caused by the natural accumulation of
precipitation, and must instead use due care in maintaining its premises. Id.
48. Id. at 155. The Durkin court hedged its ruling by observing that even if the
Massachusetts rule were applied instead of the Connecticut rule, a duty still existed
because the ice in question was an "artificial" formation caused by a defective gutter. Id.
at 157.
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The Durkin court's attempt to disavow the natural accumulation
rule, however, did not stand; two other divisions of the First Appellate
District rejected the Durkin approach in favor of the natural accumulation rule. The Third Division concluded that the Durkin approach
would place a "virtually impossible" burden on landlords, and further
correctly noted that the Durkin approach was dictum because an
artificial condition existed in that case. 49 The Fifth Division attacked
the Durkin approach on the ground that, unlike physical defects, landlords could not foresee or control intermittent natural occurrences such
as snow and ice, especially considering the "climatic vagaries of this
area with its unpredictable snowfalls and frequent temperature
changes. '
Thus, the natural accumulation rule has prevailed in
landlord-tenant cases.
Notwithstanding the natural accumulation rule, a landlord may be
held liable in three situations. First, liability may arise when a landlord
artificially accumulates snow or ice or aggravates a natural
accumulation. 5 Second, liability may arise when a landlord negligently attempts to remove the hazard.52 Finally, liability may 5arise
3
when a landlord has assumed the duty by contract with the tenant.
In practice, however, these loopholes may be illusory for most
tenant plaintiffs.54 For cases involving natural snow or ice hazards,
49. Chisolm v. Stephens, 365 N.E.2d 80, 87-88 (I11.App. 1st Dist. 1977) (stating
that "dicta in Durkin was expressly rejected by this court in Foster v. George J. Cyrus &
Co.[, 276 N.E.2d 38 (Ill. App. 1st Dist 1971)]"); see also supra notes 42, 45
(explaining that although landlords in Illinois owe a duty of reasonable care for
dangerous conditions, such a duty was irrelevant in Durkin because, in that case, the
hazardous condition was artificial).
50. Gehrman v. Zajac, 340 N.E.2d 184, 186 (111. App. 1st Dist. 1975); see also Lewis
v. W.F. Smith & Co., 390 N.E.2d 39, 43 (111. App. Ist Dist. 1979) (upholding the
natural accumulation rule for landlords).
5 1. Williams, 566 N.E.2d at 503. For example, one court held that where moisture
from piled-up snow drained onto a parking lot and refroze, and the defendant did not
place salt or cinders on the ice, the accumulation was unnatural. Webb v. Morgan, 531
N.E.2d 36, 39 (Ill. App. 5th Dist. 1988), appeal denied, 535 N.E.2d 922 (II1. 1989). For
further discussion of this area of liability, see infra part V.
52. Webb, 531 N.E.2d at 39. For example, a landlord who voluntarily clears
accumulated snow in a parking lot assumes a duty to use ordinary care in the removal.
Sims v. Block, 236 N.E.2d 572, 575-76 (111. App. 2d Dist. 1968); accord Cupp v.
Nelson, 282 N.E.2d 513, 515 (Il1. App. 1st Dist. 1972). For further discussion, see
infra part VI.
53. Cupp, 282 N.E.2d at 515.
54. Williams illustrates the frustrations experienced by many tenant plaintiffs. In
that case, the tenant plaintiff alleged that her landlord orally required tenants to clean off
snow from their automobiles before their parking lot would be plowed. Williams, 566
N.E.2d at 502. The plaintiff, who was elderly, alleged that she was injured when she
tripped on natural snow while cleaning off her automobile. Id. Since the plaintiff did
not allege that the snowplowing was done negligently, nor that her landlord coerced her
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injured tenants may have problems in attempting to impose a duty on
their landlords to remove a natural accumulation hazard based either on
a contract or a prior gratuitous undertaking. For example, even if a
landlord has removed snow or ice on prior occasions, the landlord has
no duty to continue removal, whether or not the tenant relied on the
past practice. 5 Furthermore, in cases where a landlord is expressly
bound by contract to remove the natural hazard from common areas, a
tort duty does not arise unless the landlord fails to use due care in
performing the covenant.56 Even in this instance, however, the landlord must be given a reasonable period of time in which to remove the
accumulation.57
IV. BEYOND LANDLORD-TENANT: GENERAL
PREMISES LIABILITY

Just as the Illinois Appellate Court has extended the rule to exonerate landlords, it has also extended the natural accumulation rule to all
premises liability cases. This rule serves as an exception to the general
doctrine that a business invitor owes a duty of ordinary and reasonable
care in protecting invitees against hazards of the premises.5 8 In 1968,
in Sims v. Block," the Second District Appellate Court explicitly
to clean her car with threats of eviction, the court upheld the decision granting the
defendant's motion to dismiss. Id. at 503-05.
55. See Cronin, 109 N.E.2d at 356. In Chisolm, the appellate court explained that
when a landlord gratuitously removes the accumulation, this does not create a duty to act
similarly in the future, but only a duty that the removal must be performed with due care.
365 N.E.2d at 85-86.
56. See Tressler v. Winfield Village Coop., 481 N.E.2d 75, 77 (I11.App. 4th Dist.
1985). After the original lease is signed, any new promise made by a landlord to remove
natural hazards will not create a contractual duty unless the new promise is supported by
new consideration. Chisolm, 365 N.E.2d at 84.
57. See Tressler, 481 N.E.2d at 77.
58. Ward v. K Mart Corp., 554 N.E.2d 223, 229 (I11.1990) ("It must be remembered
that under our Premises Liability Act, and at least nominally under the common law, the
landowner's or occupier's duty toward his invitees is that of reasonable*care."); Genaust
v. Illinois Power Co., 343 N.E.2d 465, 472 (Ill. 1976) ("A possessor of land owes an
invitee a duty of exercising reasonable care to discover dangerous conditions on his
land."); Stephen v. Swiatkowski, 635 N.E.2d 997, 1001 (I11.App. 1st Dist. 1994) ("An
owner or occupier of property has a duty to invitees to use reasonable care to maintain
the premises in a reasonably safe condition."); cf. Perminas v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 328 N.E.2d 290, 294 (11. 1975) (holding that once an invitor is aware of a
dangerous condition on his premises, a duty arises either to correct or to warn). In fact,
Illinois has adopted the position of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965) that
the invitor's duty of reasonable care for conditions on the premises extends to those
whom the invitor should expect will not realize the danger or will fail to protect
themselves against it. Ward, 554 N.E.2d at 229.
59. 236 N.E.2d 572 (I11.App. 2d Dist. 1968).
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concluded that landlords and business invitors should be held to the
same standard of care in removing natural accumulations.6 ° In
addition, although landowners previously owed licensees substantially
narrower duties than they owed invitees,6 ' this distinction no longer
exists in Illinois under the Premises Liability Act 62 which imposes the
same duty of reasonable care on each.6 3 Consequently, Illinois courts
now treat all those lawfully on the premises equally, and therefore,
60. Id. at 575. In Sims, which involved the alleged negligence of a landlord in
maintaining a parking lot, the Illinois Appellate Court reasoned:
[W]e feel that the standard of care required of a landlord who provides a parking
lot for the convenience of his tenants, in no sense varies from the standard of
care applicable in those instances wherein a store makes a parking lot
available for its customers.
In both cases the parking lot is a convenience designed to attract the
customers to the store and the tenants to the apartments. We believe,
therefore, that each relationship dictates the application of a similar rule as to
the care required.
Id.
The seeds of this extension, however, date much further back. See, e.g., Kelly v.
Huyvaert, 56 N.E.2d 638, 639-40 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1944) ("Our attention has been
called to no case wherein the property owner has been held liable when the icy condition
had been general throughout the neighborhood and was not aggravated, or caused in any
way by the property owner, but where the same had been caused by nature."). But cf.
Murray v. Bedell Co., 256 I11.App. 247, 250 (I11.App. 1st Dist. 1930) (assuming a
business invitor had a general duty of care to remedy a natural accumulation but
implicitly resting its decision for the invitor on assumption of risk or contributory
negligence).
61. Ward, 554 N.E.2d at 227.
62. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 130/2; see also Ward, 554 N.E.2d at 227
(noting the "substantially narrower duties" owed licensees were changed when Illinois
enacted the Premises Liability Act in 1984).
63. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 130/2. Notwithstanding the Premises
Liability Act, trespassers, including children, continue to be treated differently. See id.
§ 130/3 ("Nothing herein affects the law as regards any category of trespasser, including
the trespassing child entrant.").
In Harkins v. System Parking, Inc., 542 N.E.2d 921, 922-23 (III. App. 1st Dist.
1989), an allegedly trespassing plaintiff sued when she slipped and fell on the rutted ice
in the defendant's parking lot. The Harkins court ultimately exonerated the defendant for
two reasons: (1) as a trespasser, the plaintiff needed to allege willful and wanton
misconduct by the defendant, and (2) she failed to show that the defendant artificially
created the condition of the lot. Id. at 923-24. In such cases, the lack of a duty seems
obvious; a duty for a natural accumulation is not even owed those lawfully on the
premises, such as tenants or invitees. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
Instead, Harkins followed the Illinois position that the only common law duty owed an
adult trespasser is to refrain from willful and wanton injury, unless the landowner or
occupier discovers the trespasser, tolerates habitual trespass, or operates a highly
dangerous artificial condition on the premises. Harkins, 542 N.E.2d at 924; see also Lee
v. Chicago Transit Auth., 605 N.E.2d 493, 498-99 (Ill. 1992) (restating the Illinois rule
that a landowner merely owes trespassers the duty to refrain from willfully and wantonly
injuring them, unless the landowner discovers, tolerates, or knows about the trespasser).
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exonerate landowners and business owners from liability caused by
natural hazards.
As one might expect, therefore, appellate courts have carved out the
same exceptions to the natural accumulation rule for those lawfully on
the premises as it has for tenants. A tenant, invitee, or anyone lawfully on the land may try to show that the accumulation was artificial or
has become aggravated in some way so that it is no longer truly
natural. 64 Failing that frontal attack, those lawfully on the land have
only two other options: (1) to allege the landowner's breach of a
contractual obligation,65 or (2) to show that the landowner voluntarily
and gratuitously undertook to remove the natural accumulation of
precipitation and did so negligently. 66
V. NATURAL OR ARTIFICIAL ACCUMULATION?

The most direct way for a plaintiff to avoid the natural accumulation
rule is to show that the injury was caused either by an artificial hazard
or by an aggravation of a natural hazard. In this instance, however,
the plaintiff has the further burden of proving a link between the injury
and the hazard; merely inviting speculation about the link is
insufficient.67 For example, ice and snow made jagged and bumpy by
pedestrian trampling will not be considered an artificial condition
created
by a defendant who did not cause it but may have known about
8
it.

6

64. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. Stypinski v. First Chicago Bldg.
Corp., 574 N.E.2d 717, 718 (II1. App. 1st Dist. 1991) ("[A] landowner does have a duty,
and therefore may be liable when injuries occur as a result of an unnatural or artificial
accumulation of snow and ice or a natural condition aggravated by the owner."); accord
Choi v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 578 N.E.2d 33, 37 (I11. App. Ist Dist.), appeal
denied, 584 N.E.2d 127 (Ill. 1991).
65. This alternative is chimerical, however, because the typical contractual
obligation to remove a natural accumulation is part of a contract between the invitor and
a third party, such as a snow removal service. Wells v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 525
N.E.2d 1127, 1131 (111. App. 1st Dist. 1988). Therefore, the breach of a contractual
duty between the landowner and the third party does not give rise to a tort duty on behalf
of the invitee. Id. at 1131-32. This strongly contrasts with the landlord-tenant
situation where any contractual obligation to remove a natural accumulation exists in
favor of the tenant and may provide the basis for a tort duty. See id.
66. See infra part VI.
67. See, e.g., Madeo v. Tri-Land Properties, Inc., 606 N.E.2d 701, 704 (Ill. App. 2d
Dist. 1992) (finding no "concrete evidence" linking snow piled from defendants' plow
to a formation of ice which caused the plaintiff's fall).
68. Strappelli, 20 N.E.2d at 44. As the Strappelli court stated:
The snow and ice on the safety island in question accumulated as a result of
natural causes ....
Snow when trampled upon by many pedestrians and when
subject to alternate thawing into slush and freezing forms itself, when frozen
hard, into irregular mounds which become slippery and .difficult at times to
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The indispensable crux of the natural accumulation rule is the often
amorphous distinction between a natural accumulation and an artificial
one. For a court to classify a hazard as artificial, it must have an
identifiable cause attributable to the defendant, such as a leaky roof69
or other overhead structure, 70 an excessively sloping 7' or irregularly
surfaced parking lot, 72 or an improperly constructed sidewalk. 73 In
practice, however, the distinction itself seems more often artificial than
natural. As one court lamented: "The parties have not cited, nor have
we found, an Illinois court which has detailed the differences between
natural and unnatural accumulations. 74 Too often the distinction is in
the eye of the beholder. The Fifth Appellate District has realistically
reasoned that, in natural accumulation cases, everything turns on the
facts rather than the way in which the rule is expressed.7 5 Given the
pervasive uncertainty about the basic distinction, it is not surprising
that the Fifth Appellate District would leave the distinction to the jury
as a question of fact whenever possible.76
walk upon.
Id.; accord Erasmus v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 407 N.E.2d 1031, 1033 (Ill. App. 1st Dist.
1980) ("[P]edestrian traffic that, presumably, created the rutted and uneven [ice] surface
cannot be considered 'unnatural' on an urban sidewalk.").
69. E.g., Lapidus v. Hahn, 450 N.E.2d 824 (111. App. 1st Dist. 1983).
70. E.g., Linde v. Welch, 420 N.E.2d 490 (Iil. App. 1st Dist. 1981).
71. E.g., McCann v. Bethesda Hosp., 400 N.E.2d 16 (Ii. App. 1st Dist. 1980).
72. E.g., Wolter v. Chicago Melrose Park Assocs., 386 N.E.2d 495 (111. App. 1st
Dist. 1979).
73. E.g., Stroyeck v. A.E. Staley Mfg., 167 N.E.2d 689 (Ill. App. 3d Dist. 1960); see
also Gilberg v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 467 N.E.2d 947, 949-50 (111.App. 1st Dist. 1984)
(requiring an identifiable cause attributable to the defendant). In one case, a court deemed
a hazard artificial where the defendant piled snow around light posts, where it melted,
drained onto a parking lot, and froze. Johnson v. National Super Mkts., Inc., 630
N.E.2d 934, 938 (I11.
App. 5th Dist. 1994).
Thus, where a plaintiff slipped and fell on water located on an exit ramp inside a
laundromat, an appellate court considered the hazard natural because nothing indicated
whether the water was natural water tracked in from outside or unnatural water from one of
the washing machines. Branson v. R & L Inv., Inc., 554 N.E.2d 624, 629 (I11.
App. 1st
Dist. 1990). Another appellate court reached the same legal result where a plaintiff
slipped and fell as a result of walking in a "frosty" parking lot, but could not show
whether the precipitation was natural or the result of the defendant rinsing a bakery truck
in the vicinity. Finn v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 614 N.E.2d 358, 360 (Ill. App.
1st Dist. 1993).
74. Hankla v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 418 N.E.2d 35, 36 (I11.
App. 4th Dist. 1981);
see also Watson v. J.C. Penney Co., 605 N.E.2d 723, 727 (Ill. App. 4th Dist. 1992)
(Knecht, J., dissenting) ("The trend of modem cases is to reject the natural accumulation
of snow and ice rule. One reason may be no one understands the difference between a
natural accumulation of ice and snow, and an unnatural accumulation.").
75. Webb v. Morgan, 531 N.E.2d 36, 39 (Ill. App. 5th Dist. 1988), appeal denied,
535 N.E.2d 922 (Ill. 1989).
76. The Fifth Appellate District has held that whether a hazard is natural or artificial
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Many Illinois cases involve the problems of snow, ice, or rain
falling naturally outside a business and being tracked inside the establishment. Illinois courts have uniformly held that absent some preexisting defect in the floor, tracking natural precipitation into a
business does not make the hazard artificial.77 Similarly, snow or ice
naturally accumulating on a sloping incline does not become an
artificial hazard, even on a ramp with a thirty-degree grade. 78 Nevertheless, if a foreign substance such as oil, grease, or garden soil
becomes mixed with the tracked-in moisture, a jury may find that the
total hazard was artificial.79
With the continuing construction of high-rise buildings in congested
municipalities like Chicago, the question of duty for severe injuries
caused by natural accumulations of snow and ice tumbling from the
roofs and facades is likely to become a greater legal problem in the
future.8 0 If man-made structures, such as sidewalks, ramps, and
sloping parking lots, do not normally turn a natural accumulation into
an artificial one, it seems that the same result should follow for snow
is a question of fact for the jury to decide. Endsley v. Harrisburg Medical Ctr., 568
N.E.2d 470, 472 (II1. App. 5th Dist. 1991) (rejecting Spirn v. Joseph, 493 N.E.2d 1197
(Ill. App. 3d Dist. 1986) (finding the issue to be a question of law)).
77. E.g., Stypinski v. First Chicago Bldg. Corp., 574 N.E.2d 717, 718-19 (Ill. App.
1st Dist. 1991); see Choi v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 578 N.E.2d 33, 37 (I11.App.
1st Dist.), appeal denied, 584 N.E.2d 127 (I11.1991); Wilson v. Gorski's Food Fair, 554
N.E.2d 412, 414 (I11.App. 1st Dist. 1990); Handy v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 538 N.E.2d
846, 848 (11. App. 1st Dist. 1989).
78. See, e.g., Selby v. Danville Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 523 N.E.2d 697, 701 (I11.
App. 4th Dist.), appeal denied, 530 N.E.2d 264 (Ill. 1988) ("Plaintiff in essence asked
this court to impose a duty to guard against the dangers of a nondefective slope when
that slope is covered by natural ice or snow. This is contrary to Illinois law.");
Smalling v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 433 N.E.2d 713, 714 (111.App. 4th Dist. 1982);
Greenwood v. Leu, 302 N.E.2d 359, 363-64 (I11.App. 5th Dist. 1973). But see McCann,
400 N.E.2d at 20-21 (holding that a seven percent incline presented a question of fact).
79. See Swartz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 636 N.E.2d 642, 649 (Ill. App. 1st Dist.)
(oil and grease), appeal denied, 622 N.E.2d 1228 (11. 1993); Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 542 N.E.2d 841, 843 (II1. App. 1st Dist. 1989) (garden soil).
80. A pending trial court case involves a pedestrian killed by a chunk of ice falling
from a Chicago department store. Larsen v. Neiman-Marcus Group, No. 94 L 4091C,
(I1l. Cir. Ct. Cook County filed Mar. 8, 1994). Contemporary architecture, featuring
sloping glass roofs and inclined glass walls, creates in snowfall areas "the very real
hazard of snow and ice accumulating on these slopes and falling on pedestrians below."
Sliding Snow: A Challenge, MICROCLIMATE NEWSLETTER (Morrison Hershfield Ltd.),
1985, vol. 1 at 1-2. Snow rails to avoid icicle formation, snow-retaining devices for
sills, and heat-tracing to prevent ice and snow build-up are some ways of preventing ice
and snow from falling from buildings. Michael F. Lepage & Colin J. Williams, Cold
Room Studies for Snow and Ice Control on Buildings I (Rowan, Williams, Davies &
Irwing, Inc., Guelph, Ontario Canada) (July 19, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) ("The trend toward sloping roofs on high-rises, malls, schools and other
structures has increased the risk of sliding snow or ice in many North American cities.").
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and ice falling from otherwise non-defective buildings.8 ' Ironically,
when bricks, glass, or chunks of terra cotta fall from high-rises, the
plaintiff is not blocked from recovery, even though the danger to life
and limb may well be the same.82
Under the natural accumulation rule, if the hazard is classified as
natural, landowners or occupiers have no duty to remove it, even if
they have notice and a reasonable amount of time to remedy the
condition.83 Furthermore, if the hazard is natural, even failure to warn
about a natural accumulation is insufficient to establish liability of any
kind. 84 Even if a plaintiff succeeds in persuading a court that an
accumulation is artificial, however, no duty to remove or warn arises
unless the defendant has actual or constructive notice of the hazard.85
81. Cf. Bansch v. Donnelly, 396 N.E.2d 869, 872 (Ill. App. 3d Dist. 1979)
(exonerating a defendant where the plaintiff failed to prove that ice forming on a
building's facade was artificial, implying that liability will not lie in any case where
natural ice falls from a non-defective roof). in a related case, one appellate court upheld
the trial court's dismissal of an action by a plaintiff claiming -she was lifted and blown
ten feet due to the unnatural wind currents created by the design and configuration of the
defendant's building. Resag v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 414 N.E.2d 107, 108 (I1.
App. 1st Dist. 1980). Even if the erection and design of the building were to be
considered an artificial alteration of the land, which the court left open, a tort duty would
still not arise because the economic burden on the landowner would be so enormous as to
outweigh the likelihood of harm. See id. at 109.
82. Terry Wilson & Ben Grove, It's Not Only Mercury That's Falling in Loop, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 10, 1994, § 2, at 6.
83. See, e.g., Wolter v. Chicago Melrose Park Assocs., 386 N.E.2d 495, 501 (IlI.
App. 1st Dist. 1979); Gehrman v. Zajac, 340 N.E.2d 184, 185-86 (I11.
App. 1st Dist.
1975); Foster v. George J. Cyrus & Co., 276 N.E.2d 38, 42 (I11.
App. 1st Dist. 1971). A
duty exists, however, to comply with a city ordinance requiring a handrail. Lewis v.
W.F. Smith & Co., 390 N.E.2d 39, 43-44 (I11.
App. 1st Dist. 1979).
84. Lansing, 372 N.E.2d at 827 ("[W]e agree with the defendants' position that if
they had no duty to remove snow and ice, they had no duty to warn users of the highway
that they had not done so."); accord Branson v. R & L Inv., Inc., 554 N.E.2d 624, 629
(Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1990) (finding no duty to provide illumination or other safeguard);
Selby, 523 N.E.2d at 701; Greenwood, 302 N.E.2d at 362-63 (finding no duty to provide
illumination or warning or to provide handrails, salt, or foot mat); Newcomm v. Jul,
273 N.E.2d 699, 701-02 (I11.
App. 3d Dist. 1971) (finding no duty to warn by
illumination or otherwise). Yet, in contrast, where the natural accumulation rule is not
involved, an invitor has a duty to properly illuminate ingress and egress. See Seipp v.
Chicago Transit Auth., 299 N.E.2d 330, 334-35 (I11.
App. 1st Dist. 1973).
85. See Ostry v. Chateau Ltd. Partnership, 608 N.E.2d 1351, 1357 (Il1. App. 2d
Dist.), appeal denied, 616 N.E.2d 338 (Ill. 1993); Gilberg v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 467
N.E.2d 947, 949 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1984); Hayes v. Bailey, 400 N.E.2d 544, 546 (I11.
App. 3d Dist. 1980); Clauson v. Lake Forest Improvement Trust, 275 N.E.2d 441, 444
(Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1971).
Constructive notice arises when the hazard has existed for such a sufficient length of
time that, in the exercise of ordinary prudence, the defendant should have discovered it.
Wells v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 525 N.E.2d 1127, 1131 (I11.
App. 1st Dist. 1988)
("Plaintiff must present evidence that the defective condition, in this case the ice, not
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VI. VOLUNTARY AND GRATurrous UNDERTAKING

Plaintiffs failing to classify a hazard as artificial are not necessarily
foreclosed from recovery. Nevertheless, in natural accumulation
cases, because it is unusual for plaintiffs to sue on the basis of a preexisting contract, the only remaining realistic alternative is to show that
a defendant voluntarily and gratuitously assumed a duty, and performed the duty negligently. Even this alternative is not as easy as it
may seem, however, because Illinois courts have not been eager to
find such voluntary and gratuitous undertakings.
For instance, the law is well-established that a defendant who
removes an overlay of snow but leaves a natural ice formation
underneath, cannot be liable for falls on the ice.86 This result seems
odd because a defendant in such a case has arguably made the condition more dangerous. The risk of falling on slick, exposed ice,
particularly when there is inadequate lighting, is probably greater than
when snow covers the ice and provides greater traction.87
Furthermore, defendants who make only minimal efforts to alleviate
a natural hazard do not assume a duty to remove the hazard thoroughly. Merely sprinkling salt or other substances, without taking
further action to clear away ice or snow, is insufficient to constitute a
voluntary undertaking and is not actionable as a matter of law. 88
Similarly, a business which uses mats on its floors has no duty to
prevent the mats from becoming overly saturated with rainwater or
snow 89
the snow bank, had been there long enough to charge the responsible party with notice
and knowledge of the dangerous condition.").
86. See Graf v. St. Luke's Evangelical Lutheran Church, 625 N.E.2d 851, 854 (Ill.
App. 2d Dist.), appeal denied, 638 N.E.2d 1115 (Ill. 1994); Webb v. Morgan, 531
N.E.2d 36, 39 (I11.
App. 5th Dist. 1988), appeal denied, 535 N.E.2d 922 (II1. 1989);
Eichler v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 521 N.E.2d 1196, 1201 (I11.
App. 2d Dist.), appeal
denied, 530 N.E.2d 243 (111. 1988); Wells, 525 N.E.2d at 1131; Erasmus, 407 N.E.2d at
1033; Anderson v. Davis Dev. Corp., 241 N.E.2d 222, 224 (Iii. App. 3d Dist. 1968).
87. But cf. Wells, 525 N.E.2d at 1133 ("There is absolutely no evidence in the record
to indicate that the parking lot was more dangerous after it was plowed than before it was
plowed and that allegation will be summarily dismissed.").
88. Lewis, 390 N.E.2d at 43 ("The mere sprinkling of salt, which may cause the ice to
melt, although it later refreezes, has not been found to be the kind of act which
aggravates a natural condition and leads to liability on the part of a landlord."); see also
DeMario v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 284 N.E.2d 330, 332 (I11.
App. 1st Dist. 1972)
(explaining that the use of salt alone does not constitute an undertaking); Riccitelli, 115
N.E.2d at 290 (same).
89. Roberson v. J.C. Penney Co., 623 N.E.2d 364, 367 (I11.
App. 3d Dist. 1993);
Wilson v. Gorski's Food Fair, 554 N.E.2d 412, 415 (I11.
App. 1st Dist. 1990). No duty
exists to lay down a mat, even though defendant has used mats before for rainy or snowy
conditions. Lohan v. Walgreens Co., 488 N.E.2d 679, 682 (II1. App. 1st Dist. 1986);
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This restrictive interpretation appears to be based on policy considerations. The Illinois Supreme Court and the Illinois General
Assembly have expressed the policy that the law should encourage
citizens to take the initiative to remove ice and snow, even if they do so
negligently. 90 Therefore, following this policy, it is necessary for the
courts to refuse to recognize any duty to remove natural accumulation
hazards in order to encourage these private efforts.
VII. THE RULE IN OTHER STATES
As the Appendix illustrates, there is no clear consensus for the
natural accumulation rule. Indeed, most states hold landlords, businesses, and governments to a standard of due care. 9' Cases involving
landlord-tenant liability represent the strongest rejection of the natural
accumulation rule. In fact, only ten states adopt the rule.9 2 In
contrast, forty states plus the District of Columbia apply a standard of
due care, with many states rejecting the rule outright. 93 Furthermore,
see also Richter v. Burton Inv. Properties, 608 N.E.2d 1254, 1258-59 (II!. App. 2d Dist.
1993) (holding that the placement of mats on a ceramic tile floor did not create a duty to
cure an excessively slippery floor).
90. See Riccitelli, 115 N.E.2d at 290 ("The defendant displayed zeal in cleaning his
walks."), aff'g 109 N.E.2d 921, 922 (I11.App. 1st Dist. 1952) ("The general assumption
is that the industry displayed by citizens removing snow after a snowfall is desirable, if
not necessary."); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 745, § 75/1 (stating in the Snow Removal
Act that "[i]t is declared to. be the public policy of this State that owners and others
residing in residential units be encouraged to clean the sidewalks abutting their
residences of snow and ice.").
91. See infra appendix. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, claims against the federal
government are weighed based upon the law of the individual state. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)
(1988).
92. See, e.g., Kilbury v. McConnell, 438 S.W.2d 692 (Ark. 1969); Williams v.
Lincoln Towers Assocs., 566 N.E.2d 501 (Il. App. 2d Dist.), appeal denied, 575 N.E.2d
925 (Ill. 1991); Morris v. Boyd, 295 N.E.2d 170 (Mass. App. Ct. 1973); Gossman v.
Lambrecht, 221 N.W.2d 424 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974); Maschoff v. Koedding, 439 S.W.2d
234 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969); Rennick v. Hoover, 606 P.2d 1079 (Mont. 1980); Greenstein
v. Springfield Dev. Corp., 204 N.Y.S.2d 518 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1960); LaCourse v. Fleitz,
503 N.E.2d 159 (Ohio 1986); Weatherall v. Yorktown Homeowners Ass'n, 852 P.2d
815 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993); Davis v. Lindau, 70 N.W.2d 686 (Wis. 1955). For a
complete breakdown, see infra appendix.
93. See, e.g., Lord v. Lencshire House, Ltd., 272 F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Kopke
v. AAA Warehouse Corp., 494 P.2d 1307 (Colo. 1972); Kraus v. Newton, 558 A.2d 240
(Conn. 1989); Monroe Park Apartments Corp. v. Bennett, 232 A.2d 105 (Del. 1967);
Grier v. Jeffco Management Co., 335 S.E.2d 408 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); Rossow v. Jones,
404 N.E.2d 12 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Reuter v. Iowa Trust & Sav. Bank, 57 N.W.2d 225
(Iowa 1953); Davis v. Coleman Management Co., 765 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989);
Johnson v. Bellefonte Ins. Co., 449 So. 2d 1134 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 456 So. 2d
164 (La.) and 456 So. 2d 165 (La. 1984); Anderson v. Marston, 213 A.2d 48 (Me..
1965); Langley Park Apartments, Section H, Inc. v. Lund, 199 A.2d 620 (Md. 1964);
Strong v. Shefveland, 81 N.W.2d 247 (Minn. 1957); Wilson v. Allday, 487 So. 2d 793
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in the area of business or general premises liability, only fifteen states
have adopted the rule, 94 while thirty-four states and the District of
Columbia favor applying due care. 9" Surprisingly, only thirty-one
(Miss. 1986); Danner v. Myott Park, Ltd., 306 N.W.2d 580 (Neb. 1981); Dubreuil v.
Dubreuil, 229 A.2d 338 (N.H. 1967); MacGregor v. Tinker Realty Co., 117 A.2d 45
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1955); Lenz v. Ridgewood Assocs., 284 S.E.2d 702 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1981), review denied, 290 S.E.2d 702 (N.C. 1982); Papa v. Pittsburgh PennCenter Corp., 218 A.2d 783 (Pa. 1966); Barenbaum v. Richardson, 328 A.2d 731 (R.I.
1974); Grizzell v. Foxx, 348 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960); Cornwell v. Barton,
422 P.2d 663 (Utah 1967); Smith v. Monmaney, 255 A.2d 674 (Vt. 1969); Langhorne
Rd. Apartments, Inc. v. Bisson, 150 S.E.2d 540 (Va. 1966); Geise v. Lee, 529 P.2d
1054 (Wash. 1975); Hape v. Rath, 492 P.2d 974 (Wyo. 1972). Sixteen other states
have not explicitly referred to natural accumulation hazards in the landlord-tenant
context; presumably these states also adopt a general standard of due care. For a
complete breakdown, see infra appendix.
94. See, e.g., Watson v. J.C. Penney Co., 605 N.E.2d 723 (I11.App. 4th Dist. 1992),
appeal denied, 612 N.E.2d 525 (I11. 1993); Ferguson v. J. Bacon & Sons, 406 S.W.2d
851 (Ky. 1966); Miller v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 164 So. 2d 676 (La. Ct. App.),
writ refused, 167 So. 2d 668 (La. 1964); Baldessari v. Produce Terminal Realty Corp.,
282 N.E.2d 649 (Mass. 1972); Willis v. Springfield Gen. Osteopathic Hosp., 804
S.W.2d 416 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Boehm v. Alanon Club, 722 P.2d 1160 (Mont.
1986); Brandert v. Scottsbluff Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 235 N.W.2d 864 (Neb. 1975);
Herndon v. Arco Petroleum Co., 536 P.2d 1023 (Nev. 1975); Nevins v. Great Atl. & Pac.
Tea Co., 559 N.Y.S.2d 539 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); Strandness v. Montgomery Ward,
199 N.W.2d 690 (N.D. 1972); Weaver v. Standard Oil Co., 572 N.E.2d 205 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1989); Sullins v. Mills, 395 P.2d 787 (Okla. 1964); Meadows v. Heritage Village
Church & Missionary Fellowship, Inc., 409 S.E.2d 349 (S.C. 1991) (involving wet
grass); Hodge v. Quik-Pik Icehouse, 445 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); Watts v.
Holmes, 386 P.2d 718 (Wyo. 1963). For a complete breakdown, see infra appendix.
95. See, e.g., Terrell v. Warehouse Groceries, 364 So. 2d 675 (Ala. 1978); Kremer v.
Carr's Food Ctr., Inc., 462 P.2d 747 (Alaska 1969); Kuykendall v. Newgent, 504
S.W.2d 344 (Ark. 1974); King-Soopers, Inc. v. Mitchell, 342 P.2d 1006 (Colo. 1959);
Woods v. Prices Corner Shopping Ctr. Merchants Ass'n, 541 A.2d 574 (Del. Super. Ct.
1988); Todd v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 366 S.E.2d 674 (Ga. 1988); Robertson v. Magic
Valley Regional Medical Ctr., 793 P.2d 211 (Idaho 1990); Hammond v. Allegretti, 311
N.E.2d 821 (Ind. 1974); Hanson v. Town & Country Shopping Ctr., Inc., 144 N.W.2d
870 (Iowa 1966); Agnew v. Dillons, Inc., 822 P.2d 1049 (Kan. 1991); lsaacson v.
Husson College, 297 A.2d 98 (Me. 1972); Raff v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 233 A.2d 786 (Md.
1967); Quinlivan v. Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co., 235 N.W.2d 732 (Mich. 1975); Peterson
v. W.T. Rawleigh Co., 144 N.W.2d 555 (Minn. 1966); Johnson v. Boydston, 605 So.
2d 727 (Miss. 1992); Merkel v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 187 A.2d 52 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1962); Proctor v. Waxier, 503 P.2d 644 (N.M. 1972); Berger v. Cornwell, 132
S.E.2d 317 (N.C. 1963); Dawson v. Payless for Drugs, 433 P.2d 1019 (Or. 1967);
Morris v. Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co., 121 A.2d 135 (Pa. 1956); Cutroneo v. F.W.
Woolworth Co., 315 A.2d 56 (R.I. 1974); Mumford v. Thomas, 603 S.W.2d 154 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1980); Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1977); Wakefield
v. Tygate Motel Corp., 640 A.2d 98.1 (Vt. 1994); Kings Mkts., Inc. v. Yeatts, 307
S.E.2d 249 (Va. 1983). Wisconsin applies the duty by statute. See Wis. STAT. § 101.11
(1975). Eight states and the District of Columbia have not explicitly referred to natural
accumulation hazards in this context. Presumably these jurisdictions also adopt a
general standard of due care.
Washington courts are divided on the issue. Compare Schaeffer v. Woodhead, 821
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states allow municipalities some form of immunity for natural accumulations on streets and sidewalks, many of these by applying statutes.96
Although the justification for the rule seems most apparent in this
municipal context, twenty states still require the municipality or adjacent property owner to use due care in removing ice and snow from
the streets and sidewalks.97 In short, although Illinois has adopted
the
98
rule in all these contexts, it is one of the few states to do so.

P.2d 75 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (applying the rule) with Leonard v. Pay'n Save Drug
Stores, Inc., 880 P.2d 61 (Wash. Ct. App.. 1994) (applying due care) and Maynard v.
Sisters of Providence, 866 P.2d 1272 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (same). For a complete
breakdown, see infra appendix.
96. See, e.g., Smith v. District of Columbia, 189 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Hale v.
City of Anchorage, 389 P.2d 434 (Alaska 1964); Bittle v. Brunetti, 750 P.2d 49 (Colo.
1988); Burns v. Boudwin, 282 A.2d 620 (Del. 1971); Pearson v. Boise City, 333 P.2d
998 (Idaho 1959); Klikas v. Hanover Square Condominium Ass'n, 608 N.E.2d 541 (11.
App. 1st Dist. 1992), appeal denied, 612 N.E.2d 514 (I11. 1993); Leinbach v. State, 587
N.E.2d 733 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Speakman v. Dodge City, 22 P.2d 485 (Kan. 1933);
Commonwealth v. Brown, 346 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. 1961); Monteleon v. City of New
Orleans, 617 So. 2d'49 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Verreault v. City of Lewiston, 104 A.2d
538 (Me. 1954); New Highland Recreation, Inc. v. Fries, 229 A.2d 89 (Md. 1967);
Sullivan v. Town of Brookline, 626 N.E.2d 870 (Mass. 1994); Williams v. Department
of Transp., 520 N.W.2d 342 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Koen v. Tschida, 493 N.W.2d 126
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Harris v. Woolworth, 824 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991);
Connolly v. City of Omaha, 66 N.W.2d 916 (Neb. 1954); Rutkauskas v. Hodgins, 423
A.2d 291 (N.H. 1980); Pico v. State, 560 A.2d 1193 (N.J. 1989); Palazzo v. S.P.H.E.
Real Estate, Inc., 483 N.Y.S.2d 127 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); Clark v. Stoudt, 12 N.W.2d
708 (N.D. 1944); Lopatkovich v. City of Tiffin, 503 N.E.2d 154 (Ohio 1986); Kelley v.
Park View Apartments, Inc., 330 P.2d 1057 (Or. 1958); Solinsky v. City of WilkesBarre, 99 A.2d 570 (Pa. 1953); Hareld v. Napolitano, 615 A.2d 1015 (R.I. 1992);
Budahl v. Gordon & David Assocs., 323 N.W.2d 853 (S.D. 1982); West v. Provo City
Corp., 495 P.2d 1251 (Utah 1972); Nelson v. City of Tacoma, 577 P.2d 986 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1978); Christo v. Dotson, 155 S.E.2d 571 (W. Va. 1967); Damaschke v. City of
Racine, 441 N.W.2d 332 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989); Norman v. City of Gillette, 658 P.2d
697 (Wyo. 1983). For a complete breakdown, see infra appendix.
97. Admittedly, many of the states rejecting the rule in this context are southern
states, where ice and snow are less frequently such a problem. See, e.g., Walker v. City
of Coconino, 473 P.2d 472 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970); Willoughby v. City of New Haven,
197 A. 85 (Conn. 1937); Chambers v. Southern Wholesale, Inc., 92 So. 2d 188 (Fla.
1956); Busselle v. Doubleday, 486 N.W.2d 45 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992); City of Baldwyn v.
Rowan, 232 So. 2d 157 (Miss. 1970); Mosseller v. City of Asheville, 147 S.E.2d 558
(N.C. 1966); Browder v. City of Sweetwater, 477 S.W.2d 198 (Tenn. 1972); Latimer v.
Walgreen Drug Co., 233 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); Johnson v. J.S. Bell, Jr.,
& Co., 117 S.E.2d 85 (Va. 1960). Twelve states have not explicitly referred to natural
accumulation hazards in this context; presumably these states also adopt a general
standard of due care. For a complete breakdown, see infra appendix.
98. Only seven states, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New
York, and Ohio, apply the natural accumulation rule in all types of cases. See infra
appendix.
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VIII. THE NATURAL ACCUMULATION RULE'S SHORTCOMINGS

The natural accumulation rule should be limited or abolished. If
taken seriously, the rule favors inaction over action. Those who try to
clear away natural accumulations of snow, ice, or rain on their private
property run the risk of imposing a self-inflicted duty on themselves if
their actions constitute negligence. 99 In contrast, those who take no
action whatsoever are free of any duty, even when a pre-existing relationship of government-citizen, invitor-invitee, or landlord-tenant
exists.
Under the natural accumulation rule, an inactive defendant, who can
remove a foreseeable danger with little or no burden, never suffers
liability, even though the social unreasonableness of the inaction may
be egregious. It is true that our common law tradition does not normally impose a tort duty on a stranger to assist another.' 00
Nevertheless, a pre-existing relationship between the potential rescuer
and the person in peril has always been an exception to this
tradition.' 0" If a relationship is sufficient to create a duty to rescue
when the potential rescuer does not have control over the hazard, then
a pre-existing relationship should be all the more the basis of a duty of
due care when the defendant owns or occupies the premises on which
natural precipitation has accumulated.
The potential breadth of the natural accumulation rule, if taken
seriously, is also unacceptable. If the "naturalness" of a weather effect
is insufficient to create a duty, then a defendant who builds a hospital
over an earthquake fault line should be no more liable than a defendant
who builds a sloped roof high-rise, an inclined parking lot, an embankment, or an ice-prone bridge in a region of the country beset by
snow. Both earthquakes and snow are natural and known conditions,
yet courts would not follow the same logic in the case of an earthquake
that they do for weather conditions such as snow, ice, or rain. An
Arizona court would likely hold a defendant, who stored a high
explosive in the hot summer sun and claimed lack of duty, liable even
though the accumulation of heat on the explosive was a "natural"
condition. Similarly, an Illinois court would likely hold that a municipality owed a duty to warn of an approaching tornado even though the
tornado is a "naturally" accumulating wind condition.
99. See supra part VI.
100.

MICHAEL A. MENLOWE & ALEXANDER MCCALL SMITH, THE DUTY TO RESCUE 5

(1993) ("It is therefore interesting that in the law in English-speaking common law
countries there is no general duty to rescue in either the criminal or the civil law.").
101. Id. at 63 ('This category provides the clearest instances of a legally recognized
duty to rescue in common law systems.").
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Moreover, the natural accumulation rule is simply too vague for
courts to apply consistently. The deterioration of wood, concrete, or
metal by elements such as wind or temperature is no less natural than
the deterioration by snow, ice, or rain. 2 Furthermore, it is difficult to
classify snow or ice falling from a high-rise on a warm spring day as
either natural or artificial.'0 3 If the presence or construction of the
high-rise renders the accumulation artificial, then one may ask why
streets and sidewalks, not in themselves defective, do not convert
fallen snow, ice, or rain into artificial accumulations as well. If, for
example, a Lake Michigan wind sprays water from Buckingham Fountain in Chicago onto a concrete walkway where the water later freezes,
the whole process is a combination of both natural and artificial
causes. The essential problem, therefore, is that the categorical distinction between natural and artificial accumulations is an unworkable
concept because it oversimplifies reality by its either-or approach."°
Probably the most persuasive argument against the natural accumulation rule, however, is that the distinction between a naturally
dangerous accumulation and an artificially dangerous accumulation is
simply not relevant enough to determine a tort duty. In Graham v.
City of Chicago, °5 the Illinois Supreme Court focused on a far more
relevant factor: "It is the generality of a situation resulting from natural
causes that gives rise to the rule. Without that generality there would
be no reason for the rule."' 6 The supreme court was rightly concerned that a general snowstorm over an entire city would present such
a heavy burden on municipal authorities that the courts should not
impose upon these authorities a duty to remove natural accumulation
hazards.' 07
Following this reasoning, the "generality" of a snowstorm is not
necessarily the same as its "naturalness." For instance, snow may fall
on only a small portion of a municipality and would be no burden at all
to remove. Such a condition would not be "general" even if it is still
102. Cf ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 745, § 10/3-105(a) (providing immunity from the
effect of weather conditions, but not from physical damage to traffic signals, streets,
highways, or other public ways caused by weather conditions).
103. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
104. Cf Watson v. J.C. Penney Co., 605 N.E.2d 723, 727 (111. App. 4th Dist. 1992)
(Knecht, J., dissenting) ("The trend of the modern cases is to reject the natural
accumulation of snow and ice rule. One reason may be no one understands the difference
between a natural accumulation of ice and snow, and an unnatural accumulation."), appeal
denied, 612 N.E.2d 525 (I11.1993).
105. 178 N.E. 911 (I11.1931). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 8-15 and
accompanying text.
106. Graham, 178 N.E. at 913 (emphasis added).
107. Id.
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"natural." Similarly, a municipality may have cleared practically all of
its streets and highways, but carelessly missed one street. Again, in
such a case, the remaining snow is not a general condition, even
though the snow itself is natural. By following Graham and focusing
on whether the condition is general or specific, rather than whether it is
natural or artificial, a more rational solution to the natural accumulation
rule in Illinois can be fashioned.
Although the rule correctly concludes that a private landowner who
adjoins a public sidewalk should not be liable for a natural accumulation of precipitation, this has nothing to do with the generality of the
condition or even its naturalness. Instead, the outcome is correct
because under the common law, ownership or control over a situation
0
is an essential predicate for a court to impose a duty.0'
This result
would be the same even if another party left precipitation or an artificial
condition on the sidewalk.'0 9 Indeed, to forestall any municipal
attempts to impose liability on adjoining landowners, the Illinois
General Assembly passed into law the Snow Removal Act," 0 which
exonerates landowners from liability when they attempt to remove ice
and snow. "'
The Graham distinction involving the generality of the hazard holds
particular merit as applied to governmental entities. In the case of a
massive snow-, ice-, or rainstorm, the burden on a municipality to
protect against injury is usually great because the weather condition is
usually general. In other cases, however, the weather condition may
be limited and would not pose an unusual burden on the municipality.
Therefore, such a blanket form of immunity as granted under the
108. In Illinois, landowners have no common law duty to maintain any adjoining
public sidewalk which they neither own nor control. See, e.g., Riccitelli, 115 N.E.2d at
290 ("Both sides concede that a property owner is under no obligation to clear the snow
from sidewalks adjoining his premises."). Even an ordinance requiring landowners to
maintain public sidewalks and keep them clear of ice and snow does not create a tort duty
to an injured party. Klikas v. Hanover Square Condominium Ass'n, 608 N.E.2d 541,
545 (Iil. App. 1st Dist. 1992), appeal denied, 612 N.E.2d 514 (I11.1993).
109. In Ziemba v. Mierzwa, the Illinois Supreme Court stated:
Section 368 [of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)] presents the wellestablished common law rule that a landowner's only duty towards travelers on
an adjacent highway is to keep his land free from conditions which are
unreasonably dangerous to such travelers who may come into contact with the
condition.
566 N.E.2d 1365, 1367 (Il1. 1991).
110. P.A. 81-591, §§ 1 to 2, 1979 I11.Laws 2328 (codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
ch. 745, §§ 75/1 to 75/2 (West 1993)) (exonerating an owner, lessor or occupant of any
residential property who removes or attempts to remove snow or ice from an abutting
sidewalk unless willful or wanton).
111. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 745, § 75/2.
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natural accumulation rule is unjustified. Instead, immunity should
depend upon whether the condition is a general one, rather than
whether it is naturally created. In addition, courts should take into
account the technological advances in snow and ice removal that make
snow and ice removal far less burdensome than in 1931, the date of
the Graham decision. 1 2 Unfortunately, the fact remains that the Tort
Immunity Act protects governmental entities by codifying a version of
the natural accumulation rule. 13 Therefore, unless the Illinois General
Assembly changes its statutory scheme, courts must continue to immunize both governmental entities for accidents occurring upon public
streets and sidewalks and private landowners for accidents occurring
upon public sidewalks.
IX. A PROPOSAL FOR ILLINOIS
The Illinois courts are free to abolish the natural accumulation rule
as it applies to accidents occurring on private property. The Illinois
Supreme Court has never directly held that the rule should be extended
to private defendants, such as invitors and landlords, in cases of
accidents occurring on their private property. 1 4 Instead, all of its
decisions applying the rule have concerned government property. 1'5
Therefore, Illinois courts may abolish the rule in these contexts.
The reasons for eliminating the natural accumulation rule as it
applies to private defendants, such as invitors and landlords, are substantial. The burden on these private defendants, unlike the usual
burden on a municipality, is not general-it is specific to their locale.
Private landowners are only responsible for the limited clean-up of
their property and, therefore, the burden on them cannot be compared
to a municipality's general burden in combating a city-wide snowfall.
Not only would the burden placed upon private parties be minimal
due to the size of the hazard, but it would also be minimal in terms of
112. The development after 1931 of salt-spreaders, snowblowers, and reversible and
winged snowplows mounted on diesel trucks were major technological breakthroughs.
Telephone Interview with Roy Fonda, Bureau Chief of Maintenance, Dist. 1, Illinois
Department of Transportation (Nov. 29, 1994). The City of Chicago implemented a
snow-route parking system in 1980, and in the mid-1980s, the City extended snow
removal to side streets after every snowfall instead of just after blizzards. After the 1967
record snowstorm, the City acquired a much larger and more reliable fleet of snow
removal equipment. Telephone Interview with Terry Levin, Public Information Officer,
City of Chicago (Nov. 29, 1994).
113. ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 745, § 10/3-105; see supra notes 22-26 and
accompanying text.
114. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
115. But cf. Lansing, 372 N.E.2d at 826-27 (involving a public defendant, but
noting the appellate court extension to private defendants).
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the tasks required to cure it. Private landowners already have the duty
to provide reasonable protection to those lawfully on the land from
harm caused by defects in their premises, such as slipping on a foreign
substance, tripping over the leg of a cart left in an aisle, or stumbling
over a loose brick on a walkway." 6 To impose a limited duty to clear
snow or ice on the same pathways is no greater burden. Furthermore,
to require at least a warning, proper illumination, or salt spreading, in
place of precipitation removal, would also impose a minimal burden.
Although Illinois law requires these acts in other
cases," 7 it has failed
8
to do so in the case of a natural accumulation."
Furthermore, the risk of injury is often more foreseeable in the case
of a private defendant than in the case of a municipality. Unlike a
municipality, private defendants are far more likely to know of natural
accumulation hazards on their property. Moreover, although a citizen
may have many alternatives to encountering snow, ice, or rain on a
particular street, an invitee or tenant often has little or no choice in
encountering the dangers of naturally accumulated precipitation. For
example, if the only entrance to a store is slick with ice or snow,
invitees have no choice but to cross it. The same holds true for
tenants; they have no choice but to enter and exit their homes on a
frequent basis, whether or not their landlord has cleared the entrance of
ice or snow.
In fact, in Ward v. K Mart Corp.," 9 the Illinois Supreme Court
followed section 343A of the Restatement in holding that an invitor can
be liable to an invitee even for a known and obvious danger on the
land, where the invitor should anticipate the harm despite the plaintiff's
knowledge of the danger and its obviousness. 20 Even though a
known and obvious danger is usually an absolute defense, there are
times when a landowner should expect that an invitee will not discover
or realize the danger of a known or obvious condition of the land. For
example, an invitee may be distracted and momentarily forget the
116. Greenwood v. Leu, 302 N.E.2d 359, 363 (111. App. 5th Dist. 1973). Yet, one
Illinois court found these examples distinguishable because they did not involve a
natural accumulation of snow or ice. Id. ("None of these cases deal with the particular
problem of invitees sustaining injuries as a result of falls on snow and ice covered
sidewalks or entranceways to a defendant's premises.").
117. See, e.g., Seipp v. Chicago Transit Auth., 299 N.E.2d 330, 334-35 ([Ii. App.
1st Dist. 1973).
118. See Greenwood, 302 N.E.2d at 363 (finding no duty to provide a handrail, salt,
or a foot mat); Kelly v. Huyvaert, 56 N.E.2d 638, 639-40 (I11.App. 2d Dist. 1944)
(finding no duty to scatter cinders or sand); see supra note 84 and accompanying text.
119. 554 N.E.2d 223 (I11.1990).
120. Id. at 231-32.
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known and obvious danger.' 2 ' Alternatively, a plaintiff may have no
choice but to encounter a known and obvious danger. 22 Both of these
illustrative exceptions commonly apply to invitees and to tenants.
X. CONCLUSION
The natural accumulation rule has little merit, and Illinois courts
should, at the very least, eliminate the extension of the rule to private
defendants. 123 Private defendants should not receive such a blanket
immunity for many reasons. Unlike a governmental entity, invitors
and landlords reap direct economic benefits from patrons or tenants in
the form of prices and rents. It is only reasonable that this direct
economic gain should be counterbalanced by a corresponding duty of
care toward their customers and tenants. Even if Illinois courts imposed such a duty, private invitors and landlords would be able to pass
on any added costs of doing business in the form of marginally higher
prices or rents. Finally, even though a private defendant and plaintiff
may both know of the natural accumulation hazard, the private
defendant is in a better position to remove the hazard and is in a better
legal and practical position to eradicate it.
Contrary to some common arguments, creating a normal tort duty
for natural accumulation hazards will not make private defendants
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A cmt. f (1965). This was the
exceptional situation in Ward. 554 N.E.2d at 234 (finding that the defendant store had
reason to anticipate that a customer carrying a large item from the store might be
momentarily distracted and forget about a pole near the door).
122. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A cmt. f (1965), stating:
Such reason [to expect harm to the visitor from known or obvious dangers]
may also arise where the possessor has reason to expect that the invitee will
proceed to encounter the known or obvious danger because to a reasonable
man in his position the advantages of doing so would outweigh the apparent
risk.
Id.
123. The Fourth Appellate District recently rejected an argument that the Illinois
Supreme Court's decisions in Ward and in Lee form the basis for a change in the natural
accumulation rule. Weygandt v. Jewel Food Stores, No. 4-93-0604, slip op. at 3 (I11.
App. Ct. Dec. 30, 1993) (granting summary judgment under the natural accumulation rule
against a business invitee who fell on tracked-in water inside a store), appeal denied,
633 N.E.2d 16 (Ill. 1994). Similarly, the Fifth Appellate District rejected the argument
that the natural accumulation rule is inappropriate beyond municipality liability cases,
yet still refused to uphold a summary judgment against a plaintiff employee on the basis
that what is "natural" or "unnatural" should be left to a jury. Endsley v. Harrisburg
Medical Ctr., 568 N.E.2d 470 (I11.App. 5th Dist. 1991).
Nevertheless, Justice Londrigan of the Fourth Appellate District, in a thoughtful
dissenting opinion, argued that the rule was erroneously extended to landowners.
Smalling v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 433 N.E.2d 713, 717-20 (I11. App. 4th Dist. 1982)
(Londrigan, J., dissenting).
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insurers of their premises. Plaintiffs would still need to prove a breach
of the duty of reasonable care and would still confront the usual rules
of proximate causation and damages. In addition, unlike other states,
Illinois does not assume that the comparative negligence doctrine overrides the normally absolute defense against an invitee who encounters
a known and obvious risk. 124 Thus, even in those exceptional cases
where the invitor should anticipate that an invitee will encounter a
known and obvious danger, the partial defense of comparative negligence is still available.'2
In 1984, the Illinois General Assembly abolished the common law
distinction between invitees and licensees and required that a landowner or occupier of land owes exactly the same duty of reasonable
care to each.' 26 In doing so, the General Assembly carved out no
exception for the natural accumulation rule, even though it left intact
the common law treatment of trespassers. 27 The Illinois judiciary
would be well advised to follow this policy lead and overrule the
natural accumulation rule as it applies to private businesses, landlords,
and landowners.

124. Ward, 554 N.E.2d at 228.
125. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 735, § 5/2-1116 (requiring damages to be reduced
proportionately according to the degree of plaintiff's fault, but if the plaintiff's fault
exceeds 50%, he recovers nothing); Ward, 554 N.E.2d at 234 ("There was further ample
evidence of plaintiff's own negligence contributing to his injury.").
126. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, §§ 130/1 to 130/3.
127. Id.
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APPENDIX
THE STATUS OF THE NATURAL ACCUMULATION
RULE IN DIFFERENT PARTY SETTINGS

STATE

ALABAMA

BUSINESS/

LANDLORD/

MUNICIPALITY/

INVITEE

TENANT

LICENSEE

Due Care

No Mention

No Mention

No Mention

Applies Rule

364 So. 2d 675
(Ala. 1978)
ALASKA

Due Care
462 P.2d 747

389 P.2d 434
(Alaska 1964)

(Alaska 1969)
ARIZONA

No Mention

No Mention

Due Care
473 P.2d 472
(Ariz. Ct. App.
1970)

Due Care

Applies Rule

504 S.W.2d 344

438 S.W.2d 692

(Ark. 1974)

(Ark. 1969)

CALIFORNIA

No Mention

No Mention

No Mention

COLORADO

Due Care

Due Care

Applies Rule

342 P.2d 1006

494 P.2d 1307

750 P.2d 49

(Colo. 1959)

(Colo. 1972)

(Colo. 1988)

No Mention

Due Care
558 A.2d 240

Due Care
197 A. 85
(Conn. 1937)

ARKANSAS

CONNEcrICUT

(Conn. 1989)

No Mention
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Due Care

Due Care

Applies Rule

541 A.2d 574

232 A.2d 105

282 A.2d 620

(Del. Super. Ct.

(Del. 1967)

(Del. 1971)

Due Care

Applies Rule

272 F.2d 557

189 F.2d 671

(D.C. Cir. 1959)

(D.C. Cir. 1951)

1988)
DISTRiCTOF

No Mention

COLUMBIA

FLORIDA

No Mention

No Mention

Due Care
92 So. 2d 188
(Fla. 1956)

Due Care

Due Care

366 S.E.2d 674
(Ga. 1988)

335 S.E.2d 408
(Ga. Ct. App. 1985)

HAWAII

No Mention

No Mention

No Mention

IDAHO

Due Care

No Mention

Applies Rule

GEORGIA

ILLINOIS

INDIANA

IOWA

No Mention

793 P.2d 211

333 P.2d 998

(Idaho 1990)

(Idaho 1959)

Applies Rule

Applies Rule

Applies Rule

605 N.E.2d 723

566 N.E.2d 501

608 N.E.2d 541

(I11.App. 4th Dist.

(I11.App. 2d Dist.

(Ill.
App. 1st Dist.

1992)

1991)

1992)

Due Care

Due Care

Applies Rule

311 N.E.2d 821

404 N.E.2d 12

587 N.E.2d 733

(Ind. 1974)

(Ind. Ct. App.

(Ind. Ct. App.

1980)

1992)

Due Care

Due Care

Due Care

144 N.W.2d 870

57 N.W.2d 225

486 N.W.2d 45

(Iowa 1966)

(Iowa 1953)

(Iowa Ct. App.
1992)
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Due Care

No Mention

822 P.2d 1049
(Kan. 1991)
KENTUCKY
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Applies Rule
22 P.2d 485
(Kan. 1933)

Applies Rule

Due Care

Applies Rule

406 S.W.2d 851
(Ky. 1966)

765 S.W.2d 37
(Ky. Ct. App.

346 S.W.2d 24
(Ky. 1961)

1989)

LOUISIANA

MAINE

MARYLAND

MASSACHUSETTS

Applies Rule

Due Care

Applies Rule

164 So. 2d 676

449 So. 2d 1134

617 So. 2d 49

(La. Ct. App.

(La. Ct. App.

(La. Ct. App.

1964)

1984)

1993)

Due Care

Due Care

Applies Rule

297 A.2d 98

213 A.2d 48

104 A.2d 538

(Me. 1972)

(Me. 1965)

(Me. 1954)

Due Care

Due Care

Applies Rule

233 A.2d 786

199 A.2d 620

229 A.2d 89

(Md. 1967)

(Md. 1964)

(Md. 1967)

Applies Rule

Applies Rule

Applies Rule

282 N.E.2d 649

295 N.E.2d 170

626 N.E.2d 870

(Mass. 1972)

(Mass. App. Ct.

(Mass. 1994)

1973)
MICHIGAN

MINNESOTA

Due Care

Applies Rule

Applies Rule

235 N.W.2d 732

221 N.W.2d 424

520 N.W.2d 342

(Mich. 1975)

(Mich. Ct. App.

(Mich. Ct. App.

1974)

1994)

Due Care

Due Care

Applies Rule

144 N.W.2d 555

81 N.W.2d 247

493 N.W.2d 126

(Minn. 1966)

(Minn. 1957)

(Minn. Ct. App.
1992)
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NEVADA

The Natural Accumulation Rule

659

Due Care

Due Care

Due Care

605 So. 2d 727

487 So. 2d 793

232 So. 2d 157

(Miss. 1992)

(Miss. 1986)

(Miss. 1970)

Applies Rule

Applies Rule

Applies Rule

804 S.W.2d 416

439 S.W.2d 234

824 S.W.2d 31

(Mo. Ct. App.

(Mo. Ct. App.

(Mo. Ct. App.

1991)

1969)

1991)

Applies Rule

Applies Rule

No Mention

722 P.2d 1160

606 P.2d 1079

(Mont. 1986)

(Mont. 1980)

Applies Rule

Due Care

Applies Rule

235 N.W.2d 864

306 N.W.2d 580

66 N.W.2d 916

(Neb. 1975)

(Neb. 1981)

(Neb. 1954)

Applies Rule

No Mention

No Mention

Due Care

Applies Rule

229 A.2d 338

423 A.2d 291

(N.H. 1967)

(N.H. 1980)

Due Care

Due Care

Applies Rule

187 A.2d 52
(N.J. Super. Ct.

117 A.2d 45
(N.J. Super. Ct.

560 A.2d 1193
(N.J. 1989)

Law Div. 1962)

App. Div. 1955)

Due Care

No Mention

536 P.2d 1023
(Nev. 1975)
NEW HAMPSHIRE

NEW JERSEY

NEW MExico

No Mention

503 P.2d 644
(N.M. 1972)

No Mention
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Applies Rule
559 N.Y.S.2d 539
(N.Y.
1990)

NORTH CAROLINA

App.

Applies Rule
204 N.Y.S.2d 518

Div. (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1960)

[Vol. 26

Applies Rule
483 N.Y.S.2d 127
(N.Y. App. Div.
1984)

Due Care
132 S.E.2d 317

Due Care
284 S.E.2d 702

Due Care
147 S.E.2d 558

(N.C. 1963)

(N.C. Ct. App.

(N.C. 1966)

1981)
NORTH DAKOTA

Applies Rule
199 N.W.2d 690

No Mention

(N.D. 1972)
OHIo

Applies Rule
12 N.W.2d 708
(N.D. 1944)

Applies Rule

Applies Rule

Applies Rule

572 N.E.2d 205

503 N.E.2d 159

503 N.E.2d 154

(Ohio Ct. App.

(Ohio 1986)

(Ohio 1986)

Applies Rule

Applies Rule

No Mention

395 P.2d 787

852 P.2d 815

(Okla. 1964)

(Okla. Ct. App.

1989)
OKLAHOMA

1993)
OREGON

PENNSYLVANIA

RHODE ISLAND

Due Care

No Mention

Applies Rule

433 P.2d 1019

330 P.2d 1057

(Or. 1967)

(Or. 1958)

Due Care

Due Care

Applies Rule

121 A.2d 135

218 A.2d 783

99 A.2d 570

(Pa. 1956)

(Pa. 1966)

(Pa. 1953)

Due Care

Due Care

Applies Rule

315 A.2d 56

328 A.2d 731

615 A.2d 1015

(R.I. 1974)

(R.I. 1974)

(R.I. 1992)

1995]
SOUTH CAROLINA

The Natural Accumulation Rule
Applies Rule

No Mention

No Mention

No Mention

Applies Rule
323 N.W.2d 853

409 S.E.2d 349
(S.C. 1991)
SOUTH DAKOTA

No Mention

(S.D. 1982)

TENNESSEE

TEXAS

UTAH

VERMONT

VIRGINIA

WASHINGTON

Due Care

Due Care

Due Care

603 S.W.2d 154
(Tenn. Ct. App.

348 S.W.2d 815
(Tenn. Ct. App.

477 S.W.2d 198
(Tenn. 1972)

1980)

1960)

Applies Rule

No Mention

Due Care

445 S.W.2d 266

233 S.W.2d 209

(Tex. Civ. App.

(Tex. Civ. App.

1969)

1950)

Due Care
565 P.2d 1139

Due Care
422 P.2d 663

Applies Rule
495 P.2d 1251

(Utah 1977)

(Utah 1967)

(Utah 1972)

Due Care

Due Care

No Mention

640 A.2d 981

255 A.2d 674

(Vt. 1994)

(Vt. 1969)

Due Care

Due Care

Due Care

307 S.E.2d 249
(Va. 1983)

150 S.E.2d 540
(Va. 1966)

117 S.E.2d 85
(Va. 1960)

Split in Circuits

Due Care

Applies Rule

529 P.2d 1054
(Wash. 1975)

577 P.2d 986
(Wash. Ct. App.
1978)
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WEST VIRGINIA

No Mention

No Mention

Applies Rule
155 S.E.2d 571
(W. Va. 1967)

WISCONSIN

Due Care

Applies Rule

Applies Rule

WIs. STAT.

70 N.W.2d 686

441 N.W.2d 332

§ 101.11 (1975)

(Wis. 1955)

(Wis. Ct. App.
1989)

WYOMING

Applies Rule

Due Care

Applies Rule

386 P.2d 718
(Wyo. 1963)

492 P.2d 974
(Wyo. 1972)

658 P.2d 697
(Wyo. 1983)

TOTALS
BUSINESS/

LANDLORD/

MUNICIPALITY/

1NVrTEE

TENANT

LICENSEE

APPLIES RULE
DUE CARE
NO MENTION
SPLIT

1

